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Why	Theresa	May’s	gamble	at	the	polls	failed
What	was	the	impact	of	Brexit	on	the	2017	general	election	result?	What	difference	did
the	collapse	of	UKIP	make?	And	what	was	the	relative	importance	of	factors	such	as
turnout,	education,	age,	and	ethnic	diversity	on	support	for	the	two	main	parties?	In	a
new	article	forthcoming	in	Political	Quarterly,	Oliver	Heath	and	Matthew	Goodwin
answer	these	questions.
Theresa	May’s	gamble	was	that	the	path	to	a	commanding	majority	ran	through	not	only	retaining	the	330	seats
that	the	Conservative	Party	held,	including	an	estimated	83	of	which	had	voted	to	remain	in	the	EU,	but	also	by
capturing	a	large	number	of	Labour’s	229	seats,	especially	those	among	the	estimated	149	that	had	voted	for
Brexit.	In	essence,	this	gamble	rested	on	an	assumption	that	the	Conservative	Party	would	retain	votes	in	the
typically	more	prosperous,	more	highly	educated,	urban	areas	that	had	tended	to	back	Remain,	while	making	big
inroads	among	more	economically	disadvantaged,	less	educated	and	working-class	areas	which	had	voted	for
Brexit.
Our	analysis	shows	how	this	gamble	backfired.	Figure	1	shows	the	relationship	between	Chris	Hanretty’s
constituency	level	estimates	of	the	Leave	vote	and	change	in	support	for	Labour	and	the	Conservatives.	We
restrict	our	analysis	to	England	and	Wales,	as	a	rather	different	set	of	factors	are	relevant	for	understanding
electoral	competition	in	Scotland.	There	is	a	slight	tendency	for	Labour	to	perform	better	in	places	which
supported	Remain,	but	even	in	places	which	voted	Leave,	Labour’s	share	of	the	vote	still	improved.	By	contrast,
the	Conservatives	lost	votes	in	places	that	were	very	pro-Remain,	but	gained	votes	in	places	that	were	very	pro-
Leave.	However,	it	was	only	in	the	most	staunchly	Leave	areas	where	their	gains	outstripped	those	made	by
Labour.
Figure	1:	Estimated	support	for	Leave	and	change	in	support	for	Labour	and	Conservatives
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Going	after	such	a	hard	Brexit	may	not	have	paid	the	dividends	that	the	Tories	expected.	No	doubt	one	reason
why	May	opted	for	this	approach	was	to	try	and	appeal	to	the	nearly	four	million	people	who	had	voted	for	UKIP
in	2015.	From	Figure	2,	we	can	see	how	the	collapse	of	UKIP	affected	support	for	the	two	main	parties.	Labour
did	not	do	much	worse	in	places	where	UKIP	lost	a	lot	of	ground	than	in	places	where	UKIP’s	vote	held	up.	But
there	is	a	much	clearer	pattern	with	respect	to	the	Conservatives,	who	did	well	in	places	where	UKIP	lost	a	lot	of
votes,	but	badly	where	UKIP	only	lost	a	few	votes.	UKIP	needed	to	lose	close	to	10	percentage	points	of	the	vote
before	the	Conservatives	saw	any	increase	in	their	own	share	of	the	vote.
Figure	2:	Change	in	support	for	UKIP	and	change	in	support	for	Labour	and	Conservatives
This	suggests	that	whatever	gains	the	Conservatives	made	from	UKIP	were	offset	by	losses	elsewhere.	The
results	of	our	analysis	provides	clear	evidence	that	the	gains	the	Conservatives	made	from	the	collapse	of	UKIP
were	conditioned	by	the	educational	profile	of	the	constituency.	Conservative	gains	from	UKIP	in	low	skilled	areas
were	offset	by	the	losses	they	received	in	places	where	there	were	a	larger	number	of	graduates	(which	had
previously	tended	to	back	the	Conservatives).	Thus,	the	Conservatives	only	registered	any	benefit	from	UKIP’s
collapse	in	places	where	there	were	relatively	few	graduates.	But	in	places	where	there	were	many	more
graduates,	the	Conservative	vote	share	suffered.
Figure	3:	Estimated	Conservative	gains	from	UKIP	losses
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We	can	illustrate	these	patterns	by	calculating	the	estimated	impact	of	UKIP’s	decline	on	the	Conservative	vote	in
different	types	of	areas,	as	shown	in	Figure	3.	In	relatively	low-skilled	areas,	where	there	were	slightly	fewer
graduates	than	average,	the	Conservatives	were	very	effective	at	turning	UKIP	losses	into	Tory	gains.	In	these
sorts	of	places,	an	8-point	drop	in	UKIP’s	share	of	the	vote	translated	to	about	a	5-point	gain	for	the
Conservatives.		However,	in	relatively	high-skilled	areas,	the	Conservatives	were	not	nearly	so	effective	at	turning
UKIP	losses	into	Tory	gains.	In	these	sorts	of	places	an	8-point	drop	in	the	UKIP	vote	translated	into	just	a	1-point
gain	for	the	Tories.
There	thus	appears	to	be	a	trade-off	between	the	appeals	that	the	Conservatives	made	which	had	particular
resonance	in	more	deprived	areas,	which	allowed	them	to	make	substantial	gains	at	the	expense	of	UKIP,	and
how	those	same	appeals	were	received	in	more	high-skilled	areas,	where	they	lost	votes	and	needed	big	swings
away	from	UKIP	in	order	to	just	stand	still.	Theresa	May’s	strategy	of	aggressively	courting	the	2015	UKIP	vote
might	therefore	have	backfired,	and	been	at	least	partially	responsible	for	the	Conservative	Party	losing	seats,
particularly	in	London,	the	South	East,	and	the	South	West.
_____
Note:	this	draws	on	research	from	a	forthcoming	article	in	The	Political	Quarterly.
About	the	Authors
Oliver	Heath	is	Professor	of	Politics	at	Royal	Holloway,	University	of	London	and	co-director	of	the
Democracy	and	Elections	Centre.	He	tweets	as	@olhe.
	
	
Matthew	Goodwin	is	Professor	of	Politics	at	the	University	of	Kent,	and	Associate	Fellow
at	Chatham	House.	He	tweets	as	@GoodwinMJ.
	
	
	
British Politics and Policy at LSE: Why Theresa May’s gamble at the polls failed Page 3 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2017-07-12
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/why-theresa-mays-gamble-at-the-polls-failed/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/
	British Politics and Policy at LSE: Why Theresa May’s gamble at the polls failed Page 4 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2017-07-12
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/why-theresa-mays-gamble-at-the-polls-failed/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/
